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1. Introduction 
While many of us in the refugee protection community have traditionally seen temporary 
protection as something to be resisted, I believe that temporary protection could, in contrast, 
be a profoundly important part of a solution to the international refugee protection crisis. To 
make my argument that the right kind of temporary protection could be an important means 
to give new life to international refugee protection, I will briefly address three issues. 
First, I would like to suggest why it is that states around the world, in the North and 
increasingly in the South as well, are refusing the live up to their international legal duties to 
refugees. Second, I will argue that two kinds of reform are vital if refugee protection is to 
survive, and hopefully to prosper: the system of refugee protection must embrace a more 
collectivised system of state responsibility toward refugees, and it must become seriously 
solution-oriented. Third, I will sketch the basic elements of a rights-regarding and solution-
oriented approach to the temporary protection of refugees, which I believe should be at the 
heart of this reform of the mechanisms of international refugee law. The temporary 
protection which I see as part of a solution is not the same as the temporary protection 
practised in so many countries today, which is often not temporary but indefinitely 
prolonged, and less about protection than it is an excuse to warehouse and to deny the 
human dignity of involuntary migrants. 
2. Explaining the Crisis in International Refugee Protection 
As a starting point, we must be candid about the roots of refugee law. Notwithstanding the 
rhetoric of humanitarianism that abounds in our field, the hard truth is that refugee law exists 
because it is a pragmatic and politically acceptable means of maximising border control in 
the face of recurrent involuntary migration. By embracing, channelling, and legitimating 
essentially unstoppable flows, refugee law sustains and validates the protectionist norm. In 
this sense, refugee law functions as a sluice gate in the dam of immigration control. 
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Critically, the Refugee Convention imposes no obligation to grant permanent admission, but 
rather requires only protection against refoulement and protection of basic human rights for 
the duration of the risk in the refugee's country of origin. Nonetheless, the domestic policies 
of many states equate recognition as a refugee with a right to permanent residence. 
Assimilationist policies of this kind were embraced not out of a sense of international legal 
obligation, but because they were perceived to be in the interest of the receiving states. 
Specifically, refugees were permanently integrated in the North because of an acute post-war 
labour force shortage, coupled with the Cold War ideological "brownie points" to be earned 
via the enfranchisement of the "enemies of one's enemies." In Africa, apartheid-era political 
solidarity, and the pattern of ethnic ties across colonially imposed borders led states to 
acquiesce in the assimilation of refugees. Whether in law or simply in practice, the assumed 
solution that followed from the "interest-convergence" between refugees and the states that 
received them was to allow refugees permanently to join the community of the asylum state. 
This pattern of domestic laws or practices must not, however, be equated with an 
international legal duty permanently to admit refugees. No such duty exists. The legal 
obligation remains only to host refugees for so long as return presents a risk of persecution, 
and to honour their human rights during that risk-defined period of asylum. 
We are today presented with a fundamental challenge. The interest-convergence which 
dictated the assimilation of refugees to permanent residents has largely withered away. As 
inter-continental transportation and hence migration became more generally accessible, 
developed states of the North were confronted by the arrival of persons from "different" 
racial, cultural, political, economic, and social backgrounds. Their claims, while often serious 
from a human rights point of view, didn't quite "fit" the traditional European notion of a 
"refugee." The economies of most developed states have fundamentally evolved with the aid 
of technology to a point where there is unlikely to be the need for substantial and 
indiscriminate infusions of labour. There are in any event many people who would like to 
immigrate to developed states, and who can be "screened" for their social and economic 
suitability as immigrants in a way that refugee law does not allow. Nor are there ideological 
brownie points to be scored from the admission of refugees: if anything, refugee protection 
has often been seen as an irritant to political or economic relations with the states of origin. 
Thus, the symbiotic relationship that initially dictated substantial openness to refugees by 
developed states, and which allowed for the development of the "refugee protection as 
permanent admission" mode of thinking, is fast disappearing. 
While states of the South have rarely equated refugee status with a right of permanent 
residency, de facto permanent admission was nonetheless frequently afforded in practice to 
refugees. Yet here too, refugees are now less welcome than they once were. As in the North, 
the assimilation of refugees is least likely to be pursued where there is a lack of ethnic or other 
affinity between refugees and the communities to which they travel. This is true not only in 
East Asian states such as Brunei, China, japan, and Malaysia, where racism is as profoundly 
entrenched as in the North, but also in traditional "good citizen" asylum states. India, for 
example, which once welcomed the Tibetans and Sri Lankan Tamils, now deals harshly with 
Jumma, Chin, and Chakma refugees. Benin opened its arms to Togolese refugees, but 
confines refugees from Chad, Congo, and the Central African Republic behind barbed wire. 
Countries such as Guinea and the Ivory Coast have attempted to force refugees away by 
severe cutbacks in food rations. The illegal return by Tanzania of 600,000 Rwandan refugees 
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in December 1996, and the refoulement by Ivory Coast, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Togo of the 
Liberian refugees aboard the Bulk Challenge similarly attest to the depth of the present 
protection crisis in all parts of the world. 
As states of both the North and South have withdrawn from their duty to protect refugees, 
UNHCR's answer was promotion of the noxious notion of the refugee's "right to remain" in 
his or her own state. The "right to remain" is a superficially attractive idea: after all, the best 
solution is obviously no need to flee at all. In fact, however, the so-called "right to remain" 
has operated to keep people trapped in situations of imminent danger, since the quid pro quo 
of a credible "right to remain" - namely, consistent, universal, and effective intervention to 
eliminate the source of harm - has never been forthcoming. Nor is there any sign that the 
international community is mobilising to provide that dependable and universally accessible 
commitment to intervention. The "right to remain" is in essence not a right of refugees at 
all, but is the right of governments to avoid confrontation with the needs of refugees. 
Given that the largely self-interested goals that led states to assimilate refugees to permanent 
immigrants during the 1950s to early 1990s have largely disappeared, I believe that this is 
the moment for a decisive and practical reinvigoration of refugee law. It should at least 
provides the basic rights set by international law, namely solid protection for the duration of 
risk in the state of origin. The first priority must be to find a constructive and sustainable 
alternative to both denials of protection and the containment of refugees in unsafe situations 
- like the Kurdish "no fly zone," Bosnian Muslim "safe havens," or the illusory security of the 
Kibeho refugee camp in Rwanda. 
3. Contemplating Reform 
In sum, insistence on the traditional means of implementing international refugee law serves 
fewer and fewer people, less and less well, as time goes on. Refugee law as traditionally 
conceived is being undermined by denials of protection and disingenuous insistence on the 
"right to remain." If we wish to counter this trend, we need to think seriously about why it 
is that governments are withdrawing from their protective responsibilities. 
I believe that the decision of most states to withdraw from the duty to protect refugees is not 
just a matter of bad faith on the part of governments, or of large numbers of fraudulent 
asylum-seekers (although clearly each is to some extent a problem). More fundamentally, the 
breakdown in international refugee protection can largely be explained by looking at two 
fundamental shortcomings in the way refugee law is presently implemented. 
First is the problem of individuated state responsibility. Under the current international 
regime, refugees who arrive in an asylum state are solely the legal responsibility of that state. 
As such, the distribution of state responsibility towards refugees is based primarily. upon 
accidents of geography and the relative ability of states to control their borders. Any 
assistance received from other countries or the UNHCR is a matter of charity, not of 
obligation. This system of unilateral, undifferentiated state obligations is unfair, inadequate, 
and ultimately unsustainable. As states have no reliable means of looking to their neighbours 
or the international community at large for assistance and solidarity, there is a perverse logic 
to the option of simply closing borders and pre-emptively avoiding any responsibility for 
providing protection. 
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Second is the absence of a meaningful solution orientation in refugee protection today. 
Governments are simply not going to support a refugee protection system if they perceive it 
to be an uncontrolled and non-selective immigration scheme. If every refugee admitted to 
protection must be allowed to stay in the host state indefinitely, governments that are 
financially and logistically able to prevent the arrival of asylum-seekers in the first place will 
likely choose that option. 
This means, in my view, that the mechanisms of refugee protection need to be re-tooled to 
become fundamentally solution-oriented. By this I do not mean that refugee law should be 
expected to generate solutions to refugeehood itself. Refugee status only comes to an end 
when the violence or other human rights abuse that induced flight is eradicated. The refugee 
protection system was never intended to be a mechanism that generates solutions, but is 
instead a palliative regime that protects desperate people until and unless a fundamental 
change of circumstances makes it safe for them to go home. 
While not a source of solutions, refugee protection should nonetheless be oriented in a way 
that takes full advantage of opportunities for solutions. Because the interest-convergence that 
allowed most refugees to be assimilated to immigrants has disappeared, I beJieve that it 
makes sense to promote a system of rights-regf:lrding temporary protection, and to facilitate 
repatriation when and if conditions in the country of origin are genuinely secure. 
Governments today will not support a vision of refugee law that amounts to a back-door 
route to permanent immigration. Our choice is therefore either to accommodate that reality 
in our approach to protection, or to hold fast to an outmoded equation of refugee status with 
permanent entry. If we adopt the latter approach, we risk encouraging governments either 
to prevent the arrival of refugees in the first place, or to force refugees away by brutality. 
This is where I see the possibility for temporary protection to be a key part of the solution to 
the present proclivity of states to withdraw from their refugee protection responsibilities. The 
promotion of dignified and rights-regarding temporary protection underscores the logic of 
refugee status as a situation-specific trump on immigration control. Because international law 
guarantees refugees the right to meaningful protection only until and unless it is safe to go 
home, there is no need for refugee law to be undermined by a difficult debate about the right 
of states to decide how their body politic should be redefined through immigration. 
Some will resist this approach, arguing that anything less than the routine admission of all 
refugees to permanent residency is inadequate. Such a stance, in my view, holds refugees 
hostage to a major project of social transformation. We need instead to accommodate the 
need of refugees to flee with the prevalence of often narrow understandings of community 
inspired by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the demise of Cold War and apartheid-era 
interest-convergence. This accommodation will clearly not amount to a complete recognition 
of the right of the present inhabitants of states to exclude all outsiders. Yet the terms upon 
which refugees enter a foreign state could be qualified to prevent refugees from becoming 
pawns in the internal struggles of asylum states over the meaning of community. In 
particular, I believe that we should make clear that a solid and dependable system of refugee 
protection need not have any enduring impact on the receiving state's communal self-
definition. It could instead be oriented to ensuring that, at least in most cases, refugees 
ultimately repatriate to their own country when conditions permit. 
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I want, however, clearly to distinguish the kind of temporary protection I am talking about 
from the temporary protection that is prevalent today. Temporary protection as practised by 
most Southern states, for example, rarely converts to permanent status, regardless of the 
amount of time that passes. In fact, some refugees in the South are never even granted a 
secure form of temporary status, as has been the case, for example, with Mauritanian 
refugees in Senegal. 
I am also not talking about temporary protection as implemented in much of Europe. 
Temporary protection was resorted to there not on the basis of a principled, solution-oriented 
policy decision, but instead because the arrival of Bosnians was politically, and in some cases 
logistically, impossible fully to stop. Temporary protection in Europe, in other words, has 
been little more than a fall back strategy, resorted to because non-entree policies did not work 
as well as many governments had hoped they would. Most states in Europe responded to the 
arrival of Bosnians by granting them a kind of temporary protected status that entails rights 
below the requirements of international law. Many states, with the unfortunate acquiescence 
of UNHCR, have mistakenly suggested that the rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention 
and international human rights law do not govern the treatment of refugees protected on a 
temporary basis. This is not the case. The international rights regime applies, and provides a 
solid framework for the delivery of effective protection. 
Rather than denying the rights guaranteed to all refugees, including temporarily protected 
refugees, the self-interest of governments should be understood to be served by fulsome 
respect for the rights of the Refugee Convention. Indeed, governments ought sensibly to 
embrace policies that go beyond the requirements of the Refugee Convention to make 
temporary protection an empowering experience that lays the groundwork for solutions. If it 
is to be solution-oriented, refugee protection needs to be delivered in a manner which 
prepares for the eventual return home of refugees. Rather than isolating refugees and 
denying them opportunities for meaningful employment and education, a solution 
orientation requires that refugees use their time abroad to develop skills and abilities that will 
enable them to play productive roles in their home countries. 
In particular, repatriation will often be unsuccessful where family and collective social 
structures of refugees have not been sustained during the period of protection abroad, if 
refugees are denied opportunities to develop their skills and personalities in the asylum state, 
or when the place of origin sees the return of refugees as a threat. In such circumstances, 
repatriation efforts may lead only to poverty, violence, and even further flight. To develop the 
potential for repatriation continually to regenerate asylum capacity, it is essential that refugee 
protection be dignified, and that it be coupled with an effective system of repatriation and 
development assistance. 
The social and collective structures of refugee communities should be supported, not viewed 
with suspicion, so that there continues to be a meaningful bond to the traditions and beliefs 
of the country of origin. Successful repatriation requires efforts to maintain ties between the 
refugee and stayee communities, the provision to refugees of clear and accurate information 
regarding conditions in their country of origin, and guarantees of grassroots-focussed 
repatriation aid and development assistance. In all these ways, protection must anticipate the 
needs and challenges of repatriation and reintegration in a way that empowers both refugees 
and their communities. 
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If protection is delivered in a rights-regarding and solution-oriented manner, there is reason 
to believe that significant numbers of refugees will want and be able to return home safely 
and successfully. This, in turn, will encourage states to live up to their protection 
responsibilities, rather than avoid them. 
To advocate the value of temporary protection is not to argue that immigration is bad: it is 
simply not the same as refugee protection. While the admission of outsiders to permanent 
residence in a state may be a matter of legitimate debate for each country's body politic, the 
basic protective role of refugee protection should not be a captive in that debate. Simply put, 
the human rights function of refugee law does not require a routine linkage between refugee 
status and immigration. If the protection of refugees is both durable and respectful of human 
dignity, it need not be permanent. 
4. The South African Green Paper 
The South African Green Paper on International Migration strongly endorsed a commitment 
to the dignified and empowering protection of refugees of precisely the kind I have just 
described. The Green Paper was unequivocal in insisting upon fulsome respect not only for 
formal refugee treaties, but also for other domestic and international human rights standards. 
If its proposals had been adopted, the definition of persons entitled to seek protection in 
South Africa would have been broadened beyond simply "refugees" as formally understood. 
Refugees so defined would have been guaranteed every internationally and domestically 
codified refugee right, including to freedom of movement, to work and to education. 
Perhaps most important, the Green Paper linked its generous understanding of the scope of 
refugee protection to an activist commitment to share the responsibility for refugee 
protection with South Africa's neighbouring states of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). In short, the Green Paper proposed a model of formal refugee 
protection for South Africa of a breadth and quality beyond that which has been achieved in 
any other country. 
Yet the drafters of the Green Paper were aware that it would be foolhardy simply to propose 
a model system that lacked the resilience to respond to the challenges of South Africa's 
unique geopolitical position. Continuing instability in much of Africa presents the risk of 
future mass arrivals of refugees. South Africa's relative stability and prosperity, as well as its 
clear commitment to respect for the rule of law, make it an attractive place in which to seek 
protection. In the view of the drafters of the Green Paper, South Africa's approach to 
protection had to take account of these practical constraints. 
There were thought to be three key risks. First, if the refugee status verification procedures 
were not streamlined, experience in other countries suggested the inevitability of a backlog 
of cases waiting to be heard, leading to retrenchment from a scrupulous adherence to norms 
of procedural fairness in the interests of bureaucratic efficiency. Second, if South Africa - in 
contrast to all of its neighbouring states - were immediately to grant a right of permanent 
residence to all refugees, the volume of claims received would likely rise sharply. The system 
could be put under stress by even the arrival of large numbers of genuine refugees. But by 
far the greater risk was the magnet effect of such a system for non-genuine refugees inclined 
to exploit a fair status assessment system for reasons having nothing to do with their need 
for protection. Third, and as a consequence of the first two risks, it was thought important 
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to reconcile the needs of refugees to the critical importance of not losing public support for 
their protection. There was concern to distinguish an unstinting commitment to the high 
quality protection of genuine refugees from an open invitation to all who wished to migrate 
in search of a better life in South Africa. 
The Green Paper married its commitment to the highest quality of protection for a broadly 
defined group of refugees to its awareness that this commitment would be of no value to real 
refugees if not practically sustainable. It did so by recommending a scrupulously fair but 
speedy determination process, with only one review on the merits. It also insisted that 
refugee protection should be understood as a mode of human rights protection, not as an 
alternative immigration path. Thus, with the exception of particularly vulnerable groups -
torture victims and unaccompanied minors, for example - a grant of permanent residence 
would be delayed for refugees for up to five years. Permanent residence in South Africa 
would, in other words, be a residual solution for refugees. The norm would be a system of 
tern porary protection, in which refugee status would come to an end if and when the cause 
of flight was brought to an end. But the Green Paper insisted that temporary protection 
would be fully rights-regarding and empowering, and also that where return was not possible 
after five years, there would be a guarantee of permanent residence in South Africa. No other 
African state had ever made such a clear and binding commitment to the permanent 
integration of refugees. 
The Green Paper proposal was, however, seriously misunderstood. Objections were voiced in 
particular by some non-governmental organisations, which embraced an absolutist 
commitment to the immediate permanent integration of all refugees arriving in South Africa. 
Much more tragically, however, the official response of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was unabashedly Euro-centric in its orientation. 
The UNHCR comments on the Green Paper appeared to be taking issue with an 
understanding of temporary protection rooted neither in African practice nor in the proposals 
of the Green Paper itself. Referring to temporary protection as "a fundamental 
contradiction," UNHCR argued against "replace[ment of] the principle that international 
protection should be provided for as long as needed." Yet temporary protection recognises 
precisely that principle. Indeed, the Green Paper's commitment was that "[i]f and when the 
risk that gave rise to refugee status comes to an end ... refugee status may legitimately be 
withdrawn, and mandated repatriation pursued. Cessation of status can only be pursued 
when there has been a change of circumstances in the country of origin that eradicates the 
'root cause' of flight, and which is durable." If there were no such fundamental change of 
circumstances during the period of temporary protection, refugees would be guaranteed 
access to permanent resident status. UNHCR's criticism of the model tor promoting 
"premature repatriation" is particularly ironic since the formal cessation standard set by the 
Green Paper is a significantly higher standard than that embraced by UNHCR itself in other 
contexts. 
Virtually all of UNHCR's concerns in relation to the proposed model of dignified and solution-
oriented temporary protection similarly failed to join issue with Green Paper's real 
recommendations. It criticised the model for not insisting on the economic rights of refugees 
during protection, even though the Green Paper actually argued that the development or 
enhancement of skills during temporary protection was a critical means of " ... allowing the 
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refugee population to remain vital. .. " UNHCR suggested that the Green Paper advocated the 
permanent confinement of refugees to camps, notwithstanding the Paper's unambiguous 
affirmation of the right to freedom of movement set by the Refugee Convention. It 
condemned the Green Paper's commitment to enabling refugees to remain in contact with 
communities in their state of origin as "controversial." Yet UNHCR's own experience shows 
that the viability of return is enhanced when there has been a process of reconciliation, 
healing, confidence building, and settlement of property rights at the community level with 
those who remained behind. Moreover, sustainable reintegration will be enhanced by a 
process that lays the groundwork for development programmes directed jointly to returnees 
and to the stayee and internally displaced communities. 
UNHCR was even more stinging in its criticism of the Green Paper's commitment to sharing 
burdens and responsibilities with neighbouring countries. The agency was seemingly 
oblivious to the Refugee Convention's preambular recognition "that the grant of asylum may 
place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution ... cannot 
therefore be achieved without international co-operation." UNHCR argued that South Africa 
should go it alone on refugee protection, even suggesting that South Africa bears a 
heightened responsibility because it is (presumably in contrast to some un-named others) "a 
member of the community of civilised nations." In fact, the Green Paper clearly showed that 
South Africa was firmly committed to assuming responsibilities commensurate with its freely 
assumed obligations and its own standing in the world. South Africa has proposed to do what 
no other government in any region has been prepared to do, namely to implement a system 
of dignified and empowering refugee protection which exceeded the requirements of 
international law, and equitably to share the burdens and responsibilities of refugee 
protection with its neighbours. It is difficult to conceive of a response more genuinely 
warranting the attribution of leadership status in refugee protection. 
In the end, the non-governmental and UNHCR critiques undermined the carefully integrated 
approach of the Green Paper. While South Africa adopted a temporary protection regime, the 
system now established only vaguely resembles the Green Paper model. Instead of the Green 
Paper's administratively lean refugee status verification process, South Africa has established 
a multi-layered, bureaucratically cumbersome system for refugee status assessment. The cost 
of this shift to legal formalism was very high. In particular, the broader refugee definition 
recommended was not agreed to. The model of empowering and solution-oriented 
temporary protection proposed by the. Green Paper was not established. Nor is there any 
commitment by South Africa to share protection responsibilities with its neighbours. Even 
individual rights have been compromised, in particular by the decision of the Minister of 
Home Affairs to insert into the new legislation a clause that allows him to order the detention 
in camps of refugees arriving in large numbers, while they await their (inevitably delayed) 
asylum hearings. In short, just as the drafters of the Green Paper predicted, demands for a 
Eurocentric procedure for refugee status assessment procedure provoked reductions in both 
the scope and quality of protection. 
5. Conclusion 
If refugee law is to survive as vital and dependable system for the protection of involuntary 
migrants around the world, I believe that its goal must be clearly recognised to be protection-
48 
Perspective on Refuf(_ee Protection in South Africa 
not immigration. It is in the interests of refugees to affirm clearly that refugee protection is a 
human rights remedy, which should be de-linked from broader immigration policies. In the 
public eye, refugees frequently are grouped together with all other manner of migrants, be 
they legal or illegal, skilled or unskilled, law-abiding or undesirable. Lost is the very 
fundamental distinction between refugees and other migrants, namely the involuntary 
nature of the refugee's journey. Public opinion is left with no real sense as to the very different 
and special needs and circumstances of refugees. 
As the lines continue to blur, the public is less inclined to think separately, and perhaps more 
compassionately, about refugees. This exposes refugees to heightened levels of intolerance, 
which might otherwise be softened somewhat by a more informed understanding of their 
motives and their plight. Advocates have demanded that governments take steps actively to 
remind the public that refugees are not like other immigrants, and that they have been 
forced to flee their homes. A commitment to temporary protection, backed up by policies 
which will lead normally to repatriation, would go some way toward de-linking refugee 
protection and immigration policy in general, thereby restoring the focus of attention to the 
human rights basis of refugees' presence in host countries. 
Most refugees cherish a hope of return. Protection, if carefully designed and delivered, is the 
critical complement to root causes intervention. Even as states give increasing attention to 
efforts intended to end the need to flee, we must not fail to renovate the means by which 
we protect those who cannot wait for our efforts to succeed. A more collectivised system of 
solution-oriented temporary protection offers the best hope of keeping the institution of 
asylum alive. 
The endorsement of this important balancing exercise is not a defeat, but is rather an 
opportunity to assert refugee rights in a context that behoves states to take our positions 
quite seriously. In contrast, the moral absolutism of those who will accept no form of 
protection less than the routine and automatic permanent integration of all refugees can be 
- and is - readily dismissed by governments that are justifiably concerned to ensure the 
well-being of their own body politic. We must never accept the inevitability of the deterrence, 
maltreatment, or containment of refugees. But these invidious practices are best combated 
not with rhetorical absolutism, but by reliance on the kind of principled pragmatism, which 
a policy of rights-regarding, and solution-oriented temporary protection could provide. 
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